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CONSTRUCTING A NEW AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION
Keith E. Whittington*
Problems of constitutional interpretation have occupied a
prominent part of the scholarly agenda for quite some time, and
rightly so. Theories of constitutional interpretation help guide
and legitimate the work of the judiciary. They grapple directly
with what the courts say they do and with many of the issues that
lawyers routinely face. Understanding what should be
interpreted, how it should be interpreted, and who has the
authority to interpret are all important and basic to the
1
constitutional enterprise.
Interpretation is not all that we do with constitutions,
however. Interpretive practice is supplemented through a
process of constitutional construction. Constitutional scholarship
has given increasing attention to the idea of construction as a
feature of the constitutional enterprise that is distinct from
interpretation and that is worthy of analysis in its own right.
In this Article, I reintroduce the concept, clarify a couple of
features of the idea of constitutional constructions as I
understand it, and suggest some possible benefits of
constructions as a conceptual tool. The Article proceeds first by
discussing what constitutional construction is and how it relates
to constitutional interpretation. Part II considers the extent to
which courts engage in constitutional constructions. Part III
considers whether it is possible to avoid constitutional
constructions. The Article concludes by suggesting ways in which
the concept can be useful to various scholarly literatures.

* William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Politics, Princeton University.
1. See Walter F. Murphy, Who Shall Interpret?: The Quest for an Ultimate
Constitutional Interpreter, 48 REV. POL. 401, 401 (1986).
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I. WHAT IS A CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION?
Constitutional construction is one mechanism by which
constitutional meaning is elaborated. It works alongside
constitutional interpretation to elaborate the existing
constitutional order. The process of constitutional construction is
concerned with fleshing out constitutional principles, practices
and rules that are not visible on the face of the constitutional
text and that are not readily implicit in the terms of the
constitution.
We can imagine a continuum of actions that political actors
can take under a Constitution, ranging from policymaking to
revolution. At one end of the continuum, political actors can
take constitutional forms as a given and make policy decisions
under it, filling government offices and exercising government
power in (constitutionally) noncontroversial ways. Policymaking
seeks to exercise constitutional authority, and its implications for
elaborating or altering constitutional meaning are only implicit.
At the other end of the spectrum, political actors can engage in
revolution and replace the existing constitutional order or
document wholesale in favor of a new one. The Articles of
Confederation can be displaced in favor of the U.S. Constitution.
Less extreme than revolution is creation, which adds new text to
a preexisting Constitution. Creation embraces a revisionary
authority, but the revisions are partial rather than total. They
2
amend and reform the Constitution, rather than throw it over.
Interpretation and construction are both concerned with
elaborating, developing and effectuating the preexisting
Constitution. Unlike the mere policymaker, the interpreter or
constructor engages the Constitution directly and attempts to
address and resolve contested claims about constitutional
meaning. But political actors engaged in these tasks do not claim
the authority to revise, amend or alter the Constitution. They
claim only the lesser authority of attempting to understand and
realize the Constitution as they found it.
Construction lies closer along the continuum to the process
of creation, however. Construction picks up where interpretation
leaves off. Interpretation attempts to divine the meaning of the
3
text. There will be occasions, however, when the Constitution as
2. See also KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION 3–5
(1999).
3. For these purposes, I bracket the issue of how best to interpret a constitutional
text. One can accept a fairly capacious understanding of the interpretive process and still
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written cannot in good faith be said to provide a determinate
answer to a given question. This is the realm of construction.
The process of interpretation may be able to constrain the
available readings of the text and limit the permissible set of
political options, but the interpreter may not be able to say that
the text demands a specific result. Further judgments, further
choices, about how to proceed within those bounds are made
through the process of construction. Constitutional meaning is
no longer discovered at that point. It is built.
But constitutional constructions are built within the
boundaries, or to use Jack Balkin’s phrase, within the
4
framework, of the interpreted Constitution. They partake of the
process of constitutional creation in the sense that constructions
are necessarily creative, but not in the sense that they have the
authority to revise the constitutional text or the discoverable
meaning of that text. The process of construction takes over
when the traditional tools of interpretation exhaust themselves.
In order to do so, those who construct constitutional meaning
must lean more heavily on external considerations to bring
determinacy to what interpretative arguments leave
indeterminate. Put differently, constitutional constructions make
normative appeals about what the Constitution should be,
melding what is known about the Constitution with what is
desired.
Constructions are, by their nature, temporary. An
interpretation of a text attempts to capture the true meaning of
the text. Any interpretation will be revisable in light of later
argument and evidence. Any interpretation is likely to be partial,
since it will be motivated by a particular question and
controversy, and thus may highlight some features of
constitutional meaning while pushing others into the
background. Interpretations aim to be accurate extensions of the
fixed text. Interpretations should, therefore, be enduring except
to the extent to which there is more to be said about them or
they can be made more accurate. By contrast, constructions are
make room for a supplementary and distinguishable process of construction. As long as
an interpretive approach is capable of recognizing gaps and indeterminacies in
constitutional meaning, then it is capable of recognizing the value of constitutional
constructions. As a result, I would resist tying the concept of constitutional constructions
to any specific controversial claim about what interpretation means or how best to
interpret. Cf. Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST.
COMMENT. 95 (2010).
4. Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 NW.
U. L. REV. 549 (2009).
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meant to settle indeterminacies to the satisfaction of immediate
political interests. Constructions involve judgments and choices
about how best to resolve those indeterminacies. Those choices
can be revisited without disturbing the constitutional text itself
or the discoverable meaning of the constitutional text. If a
construction no longer serves the interests or expresses the
values of important political actors, then it can and often will be
revisited. A successful constitutional construction may span
centuries, or merely a political generation. We currently think
we know the answer to such basic questions as whether a state
has a right to secede from the union or whether the Senate’s
“advice and consent” function can be exercised entirely through
post-negotiation treaty ratification or whether presidents can
appropriately veto legislation on policy grounds, but those
answers depend on settlements that could, in the right
circumstances, be undone. Those constitutional resolutions may
be venerable, but they reflect contingent choices made within
the constitutional framework not essential requirements of the
Constitution itself.
Let me give three illustrative examples of situations in
which constructions might play a role in constitutional practice.
This set of examples is not intended to be exhaustive, but to
clarify what constructions are and how they fit within the
5
continuum of actions that can be taken under a Constitution. In
particular, the examples highlight the relationship between
interpretation and construction. Constructions occur in the
context of textual vagueness, constitutional gaps, and
constitutional inspirations.
First, constitutional vagueness occurs when there is
uncertainty as to where exactly the boundaries of a
constitutional rule, standard or principle might be. Some
constitutional rules may have precise boundaries, leaving little
uncertainty or vagueness about what is covered by the rule and
what is excluded. Others may have indeterminacies at their
boundaries. Interpretation may be able to help specify what rule
a constitutional provision seeks to convey and identify the core
meaning of a term, but the meaning of a term as it might apply in
more marginal contexts may be underdetermined.
A number of constitutional provisions and principles are
vague to some degree. They have a clear core of meaning, which
provides ready answers for many questions about how the
5. See also WHITTINGTON, supra note 2, at 8–9.
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provisions ought to be applied. Interpreters would be capable of
recognizing government actions that are permissible and those
that are impermissible. But some questions, including some
questions of immediate political importance, might fall in
between, where it is unclear whether government action is
permissible or impermissible. We might, for example, agree with
many nineteenth-century commentators in thinking that the
Interstate Commerce Clause had clear and determinate meaning
about some things. Commercial transactions across state
boundaries and the transportation of economic goods across
state boundaries were within the core meaning of interstate
commerce. They were “paradigm cases” of the rule embodied in
6
the commerce clause. On the other hand, commentators widely
agreed that the federal regulation of manufacturing was outside
the bounds of the Interstate Commerce Clause. Between these
two areas of relative interpretive clarity were areas of relative
indeterminacy. Did, for example, the Interstate Commerce
Clause by implication disempower the states from interfering
with interstate commerce? When did goods pass from the realm
of interstate commerce to the realm of intrastate commerce?
Once the limits of interpretation are reached, further textual
analysis or historical inquiry or structuralist argument may
provide grist for the mill but they will not resolve the
indeterminacy. Within that zone of construction, choices will
have to be made as to how best to realize the constitutional
project going forward.
Second, constitutional gaps occur when the constitutional
text provides no clear instruction for resolving important
constitutional issues. Such “gaps” may be the product either of
genuine oversight by constitutional drafters or of delegation to
future political decision-makers. While interpretation is
ultimately about discovering the meaning implicit in the text that
is there, construction is concerned with addressing constitutional
subject matter and resolving indeterminacies. If a given
Constitution fails to make adequate provision for a given
action—or simply leaves some decisions to be made by political
actors operating through conventional political means—
construction fills the gap. Arguably, the removal power is an
instance of such a gap. The U.S. Constitution specifies how
executive branch officials are to be appointed, but does not
6. JED RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION BY JUDICIARY 15 (2005). I do not mean to
embrace all of Rubenfeld’s approach to thinking about the structure of constitutional
law, but his language is useful here.
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specify how they are to be removed from office, except by
impeachment. The First Congress puzzled over several
alternatives as to how officers might be removed and how such
removals might be constitutionally justified. The statutes
creating the Cabinet departments settled on unilateral
presidential removal, but there was little agreement in Congress
7
over the rationale behind that settlement. A removal power is a
requisite part of the constitutional scheme. Although there are
interpretive arguments that can dissolve the apparent
8
constitutional gap in this particular case, the eventual statutory
settlement in favor of a unilateral presidential removal power
can be readily understood as a relatively successful constitutional
construction to resolve a textual indeterminacy in a workable
and normatively attractive way. Somewhat differently, the
decisions to have individual citizens vote to select presidential
electors or to elect members of the U.S. House of
Representatives by single-member geographic districts fill out
the effective meaning of the U.S. Constitution and the
functioning scheme of government. In those cases, the
Constitution leaves to state legislative discretion how
presidential electors will be chosen and how House members
will be elected. In both cases, the “gap” has since been filled in
with substantive content, severely limiting legislative discretion.
Our working Constitution is one in which citizens choose their
electors (and the electors exercise no autonomy) and House
members represent single-member districts.
Third, constitutional inspirations occur when political actors
take constitutional requirements as their starting points and seek
to supplement them. The constitutional text, alongside other
documents, can be a source of political inspiration. Its terms and
provisions can help support, legitimate, and mobilize demands
for reform and action. Political inspiration is not the same thing
as interpretation, however, and calls for action may outrun what
a careful interpreter would say that the constitutional text can
support or require. Construction can supplement what
interpretation provides. Constitutional rights provisions are the
7. See Keith E. Whittington, The Separation of Powers at the Founding, in
SEPARATION OF POWERS 11 (Katy J. Harriger ed., 2003).
8. Interpretive claims could be made, for example, that the Constitution positively
precludes anyone from removing executive officers through any mechanism other than
impeachment or that presidential removal is implicit in the “executive power” of Article
II. Likewise, it would be an interpretive claim to contend that Congress had freedom to
legislate on this subject via the Necessary And Proper Clause. The specific path that
Congress chose to take (unilateral presidential removal) was an act of construction.
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9

easiest example. Rights provisions give rise to a political
rhetoric and mobilization aimed at defending and expanding the
scope of those rights. Statutes, executive actions and judicial
decisions expanding civil rights and liberties build not only on
interpretations of what constitutional provisions require but also
on ideas about what rights individuals ought to have in
contemporary society. Assume arguendo that, properly
interpreted, the First Amendment does not protect seditious
libel, the Second Amendment does not protect individual gun
ownership, that the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit
execution by firing squad, or that the Thirteenth Amendment
does not apply to “wage slavery” and require rights of collective
bargaining. There is nothing that prevents citizens from
mobilizing around those more expansive ideas of their rights and
government officials from acting to recognize and effectuate
those ideas. The knowing lawyer might well say that the
Thirteenth Amendment does not mean that labor organizing is
entitled to constitutional protection, but the labor activist or
legislator might well argue that protections for labor are
necessary for realizing the requirements and promise of the
10
Thirteenth Amendment.
II. COURTS AND CONSTRUCTIONS
Who should construct the Constitution? What role do
courts play in constructing the Constitution? These are two
distinguishable questions about the relationship between courts
and constitutional construction. One raises normative issues
about whether and under what circumstances courts should
engage in constitutional construction. The other raises empirical
questions about whether courts have in fact been active players
in offering and developing constructions that have shaped our
constitutional understandings and practices. I have not spent
much time, in those terms, pursuing the descriptive account of
how courts have actively constructed constitutional meaning
over time. It would not be a difficult task to show that the courts

9. This process can obviously produce more difficult dynamics as well from the
perspective of interpretive constitutional fidelity. The debate over Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment points to exactly these issues.
10. On the latter, see James Gray Pope, Thirteenth Amendment versus the
Commerce Clause: Labor and the Shaping of American Constitutional Law, 1921-1957,
102 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2002); REBECCA E. ZIETLOW, ENFORCING EQUALITY 63–94
(2006).
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have engaged in what I call the process of construction. The
more interesting immediate questions are the normative ones.
Some of those who have embraced the interpretationconstruction distinction are also comfortable with the courts
actively engaging in construction. For Randy Barnett, one of the
virtues of the interpretation-construction distinction is that it
allows us to recognize that when we reach the boundaries of
interpretation the meaning of the text may still be
underdetermined and need to be supplemented. With Dworkin,
Barnett would call on the courts to construct the Constitution so
that it is the “best it can be” so as to enhance its legitimacy and
12
promote liberty. Somewhat differently, Jack Balkin makes no
distinction between courts and other institutions that might
engage in the process of construction. Every governmental
institution—as well as a variety of nongovernmental actors—is
equally engaged in the process of creating the “living
constitution.” Courts may not have the most important role to
play in Balkin’s theory, but they are equally able to interpret or
13
construct constitutional meaning.
I have been more skeptical about the use of construction by
the courts. I initially argued:
The judiciary should seek to enforce the correct
interpretation of the Constitution, but it should also avoid
enforcing even venerable constructions. This caution does not
require that the judiciary identify constructions per se, only
that it keep its eye on interpreting the Constitution while
simultaneously bearing in mind the possibility of
constitutional indeterminacy. The judiciary should not prop
up old constructions that are no longer politically
authoritative, and it should avoid stifling the development of
new constructions by placing the judicial imprimatur on the
old and contributing to its hegemonic status. Constructions
claim the fidelity of political actors through their continuing

11. My recent work has been concerned, in part, with examining why courts are so
prominent in American constitutionalism given the importance of extrajudicial actors in
constitutional constructions. The importance of extrajudicial constitutional action to our
system does not mean that there will not also be a lot judicially produced constitutional
law. See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY
(2007).
12. Randy Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 646
(1999) (quoting RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 62 (1986)); see also RANDY
BARNETT, THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 118–27 (2004).
13. Balkin, supra note 4, at 559.
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14

political authority, not through judicial enforcement.

My concern was with what Robert Cover characterized as the
“jurispathic” quality of courts and the possibility that judiciary
15
would artificially limit the development of new constructions.
Moreover, the authority of the courts to construct
constitutional meaning would not necessarily stand on the same
footing as their authority to interpret the Constitution. One of
the starting points for my earlier explorations of originalism and
theories of constitutional interpretation was a concern for
justifying the practice of judicial review. I, at least, am satisfied
that courts can assert an authority to nullify the actions of other
government officials when judges act on behalf of constitutional
16
interpretations. Constructions present a different problem.
17
They are “essentially political.” The arguments that justify
judicial review on the basis of interpretation are not satisfactory
to demonstrate that the courts should also exercise judicial
review on the on the basis of constitutional constructions. It is, I
believe, a harder case to make out that courts should have the
authority to trump the actions of elected officials merely on the
18
basis of constitutional constructions.
Despite such concerns, I have always recognized some role
for the courts in engaging in constitutional construction. Most
fundamentally, the power of judicial review itself is plausibly
understood as a construction of the Constitution. Similarly, the
ways in which the courts ought to exercise the power of judicial
review are not a matter to be resolved by constitutional
interpretation. Standards of deference, methods of constitutional
interpretation, and the like are themselves ultimately a matter of
constitutional construction. The argument that judges should
generally limit themselves to enforcing interpretations, that
judges should be originalists, or that judges should adopt a clear
mistake rule when exercising judicial review would be a claim
about how an indeterminate feature of the constitutional scheme
ought to be settled. Judges would not be alone in developing,
establishing and maintaining such constructions, but they would
necessarily play a central role. Other, more substantively
14. KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 11 (1999).
15. Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 40 (1983).
16. See Whittington, supra note 14, at 46–50.
17. WHITTINGTON, supra note 14, at 6.
18. See Keith E. Whittington, The Death of the Legalized Constitution and the
Specter of Judicial Review, in THE COURTS AND THE CULTURE WARS (Bradley C.
Watson & Gary M. Quinlivan eds., 2002).
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particular constructions may be particularly appropriate to the
judiciary, either because of their institutional focus or because of
their subject matter. The federal exclusionary rule and the
Miranda requirements can be understood as efforts at
construction, building out the effective requirements of
constitutional provisions beyond what the text strictly speaking
means. Judicial constructions would encompass some of what
Mitch Berman has characterized as “decision rules” or what
Dick
Fallon
has
characterized
as
constitutional
19
“implementation.”
It would thus be overstated to think of the interpretationconstruction distinction strictly in institutional terms.
Constitutional interpretation may put the judiciary on the
strongest footing for exercising the power of judicial review and
overturning the actions of other government officials, but there
are circumstances in which judges like other political actors
might engage in constitutional construction. When doing so, they
are undertaking a particularly political task, a creative task
involving normative choices in a realm of constitutional
indeterminacies. Their particular expertise and institutional
authority as judges is undoubtedly lessened when operating in
the zone of construction than when on the firmer, traditionally
legal ground of interpretation. There are occasions when such
actions are unavoidable, as when determining how the power of
judicial review ought to be exercised, and judicial constructions
of the Constitution are unlikely to occur in isolation from the
deliberations of other political actors. But there are other
occasions when judicial constructions are, in principle, more
avoidable.
I have been persuaded over time that there is more room
for courts in developing and maintaining constitutional
constructions than I initially suggested. I am not inclined to think
of every instance of a judicial doctrine or application of a
constitutional rule as a “construction” of constitutional meaning,
but there certainly is space to recognize some judicial doctrines
20
as efforts at filling in the constitutional framework. Somewhat
19. Mitchell Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1 (2004); see
also RICHARD H. FALLON JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION (2001).
20. At one level, the question of labels makes little difference, and whether judicial
doctrine as such is usefully labeled as a “constitutional construction” or viewed as
parallel to or continuous with other phenomenon of that type is ultimately a matter of
analytical pragmatism. My tentative inclination is to view, for example, the three-part
Lemon test or the stream of commerce doctrine less as constructions than as bureaucratic
guidelines. Having construed the meaning of the relevant constitutional provision, the
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more problematic but empirically common is the possibility of
courts being called upon to implement, extend, and rationalize
constitutional constructions that are more widely shared by
government officials in the political system generally. As the
neo-Dahlian literature has highlighted, the relationship of the
courts to the other branches of government is often not strictly
countermajoritarian. Instead, the courts often act as partners
with other government officials to implement a common
constitutional vision, with judges sometimes acting when and
where it is politically inconvenient or infeasible for elected
21
officials to do so. In that context, many political actors may
welcome the courts stepping in to construct constitutional
meaning, resolve indeterminacies, and maintain consensual
values in specific cases. The difficulty arises, however, when that
process becomes less consensual and power and influence shifts
into the courts. So long as judges are acting as faithful agents to
provisionally maintain constitutional understandings widely
shared by other political actors, then their role in articulating
constitutional constructions may not be objectionable. As they
become innovators on behalf of constitutional understandings
that are not widely shared by other political actors, then the
legitimacy of courts engaging in constitutional construction
would seem to be limited.
III. AVOIDING CONSTRUCTIONS?

22

It might be thought that constitutional construction is
entirely avoidable, that the constitutional system could operate
entirely in the realm of constitutional interpretation. If so, then
we might think that constitutional constructions are a choice
made by political actors who seek to expand their own influence
and discretionary authority. Rather than limiting themselves to

Court in subsequent cases is less concerned with grappling with constitutional meaning
than with articulating a set of secondary rules that adequately embody those
constitutional understandings and that can be enforced by and against other government
officials. Judicial doctrines are one of the routine policy implications that might be
expected from the process of engaging in constitutional interpretation and construction.
21. See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL
SUPREMACY (2007); Howard Gillman, Courts and the Politics of Partisan Coalitions, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLITICS (Keith E. Whittington, R. Daniel
Kelemen, & Gregory A. Caldeira eds., 2008); Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian
Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35 (1993);
Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National
Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957).
22. I am grateful to Gary Lawson for raising the issues discussed in this section.
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constitutional interpretation, political actors may choose to
engage in constitutional construction.
How might this work? We might imagine constitutional
constructions are avoidable in two types of circumstances. The
first possibility is that a Constitution might be written such that
its terms are entirely clear, complete and determinate. A
sufficiently clear and comprehensive constitutional document
would render constitutional construction unnecessary. All
constitutional issues could be addressed by reference to
interpretation of the text. In practice, no text will have that
degree of clarity or comprehensiveness. There will always be
points of indeterminacy or new constitutional practices,
institutions or principles that will be developed beyond what is
specified in the text. The U.S. Constitution may seem to create
more room for construction because of its inclusion of abstract
phrases and its relative difficulty of amendment, but even a
constitutional document that emphasized specific rules and that
was easy to amend would be supplemented by a host of statutes,
decisions, and practices that would create a working
constitutional system. In practice, every Constitution is a
23
“framework,” not a “skyscraper.”
The second possibility is that constitutional constructions
are precluded by baseline assumptions. If the constitutional
system had a sufficient set of default assumptions in place, then
any constitutional indeterminacies might be resolvable. Two
familiar default rules might be mentioned. The clear mistake
rule indicates that judges should defer to legislatures and uphold
a law unless its unconstitutionality is very clear. The principle of
strict construction of enumerated powers indicates that Congress
should have to be able to positively demonstrate that it possesses
a power under the Constitution in order to exercise it, otherwise
the power is retained by the states. It might well be possible in
the case of all constitutional controversies to identify a default
rule that would indicate which side should prevail in the case of
interpretive indeterminacy. Rather than constructing a new
substantive answer in a constitutional controversy, we might
think the appropriate response is to recur to the default rule and
do nothing more than interpret the Constitution.
There are at least three responses to this concern about
default rules and whether they render constitutional
constructions unnecessary. First, we should recall that the zone
23. Balkin, supra note 4, at 550.
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of construction is properly delimited by constitutional
interpretation. Constructions cannot be used to alter, revise or
amend the constitutional text, properly interpreted. If one
concern about the interpretation-constructions distinction is that
it becomes a vehicle for exploiting constitutional indeterminacies
in order to expand judicial power or the scope of federal
authority, then this misconstrues the role of construction vis-àvis interpretation. If interpretation determines that the
production of goods is outside the scope of the Interstate
Commerce Clause, for example, then construction cannot alter
that conclusion and expand federal regulatory authority. The
idea of construction does not authorize government officials to
contradict the constitutional text and its understood meaning.
The idea of construction describes how political actors work
within and around that constitutional skeleton.
Second, for the most part default rules are themselves best
understood as constructions. The Constitution provides
relatively little guidance for most default rules that we might
want to develop. A faithful interpreter would be hard-pressed to
discover a determinate set of default assumptions embedded in
the Constitution. Nonetheless, default rules are an appropriate
constitutional subject, and there is a ready set of constitutional
materials that can be used to construct arguments about what
kinds of default rules would be most suitable and desirable for a
country such as ours. Should judges adopt a “clear mistake rule”
and work with a default that laws are constitutional? Should
judges adopt a “presumption of liberty” and work with a default
that laws are constitutionally dubious and require justification?
Is a strict construction of enumerated powers which assumes that
national powers that cannot be specifically justified are reserved
exclusively to the states best in keeping with our federal system?
Or is a broad construction of national powers that assumes that
federal power is constitutional unless it conflicts with specific
prohibitions or cannot be grounded in any reasonable reading of
a grant of power more appropriate to the national union? It
would certainly be possible to choose among these, and other,
default rules, and as a result hem a given political decisionmaker in. Once the default rule is in the place, the decisionmaker knows what to do when she encounters constitutional
indeterminacy. She knows that policymaking discretion should
now pass from actor X to actor Y. When in doubt, the court
should uphold the law (or strike it down); federal power should
be disfavored (or favored); etc. Putting the default rules in place,
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however, is not a mechanical or a purely interpretive task. The
default rules are themselves (properly) part of what political
actors have struggled over and rearranged over time. They have
been constructed and reconstructed. Once in place, they can be
interpreted and applied, but the development of the default rules
is a task for constitutional construction.
Third, default rules are most relevant when thinking about
certain contexts in which constitutional controversies arise. In
particular, default rules are helpful for dispute resolution and for
maintaining clean lines of institutional responsibility. If a
comprehensive set of default rules were to be put in a place
within a constitutional system, they might reduce the need for
constitutional construction to deal with indeterminacies on a
case-by-case basis, but they would not make constructions
entirely unnecessary. Default rules are unlikely to eliminate all
indeterminacy. They require further refinement and development themselves. That is, once agreement has been reached on
the big issues, further work must often still be done constructing
meaning on the margins of the initial settlement and resolving
remaining indeterminacies. The case of enumerated powers
provides an example. The old-school Jeffersonians agreed
among themselves on the importance of strict construction and
on the basic principles of enumerated powers. They accepted a
default rule that when in doubt about congressional powers,
make the assumption that Congress did not have the authority to
act and that the power was instead reserved to the states. They
soon disagreed among themselves, however, about where
sufficient doubt about congressional power crept in. The margins
of congressional power still needed to be defined. Presidents
Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe all disagreed among themselves
over the precise formulation for thinking about the problem of
federal authority over internal improvements. Within the broad
contours of strict constructionist thinking, the detailed balancing
of the needs of state and nation, the competing conceptions of
state sovereignty and their demands, and the calculus of threats
posed to the constitutional design and social welfare could lead
to different conclusions about what specific rules should guide
24
policymakers in the case of internal improvements. Strict
constructionism structures and guides constitutional argument
and decisionmaking. Such default rules do not avoid the need for

24. See HOWARD GILLMAN, MARK A. GRABER, & KEITH E. WHITTINGTON,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (forthcoming).
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further constitutional deliberation and decisionmaking. They
concentrate and narrow the scope of those deliberations.
Once we know, whether by default rule or otherwise, that a
given institutional actor has authority over a set of policy
decisions, there is still an open question as to how that authority
ought to be exercised. In many cases, how that authority should
be exercised is strictly a policy matter and takes place below the
level of constitutional discourse. In other cases, however,
constitutional constructions come into play to further constrain
the discretion of political actors. Constitutional constructions
may provide substantive content or sets of principled
considerations that delimit (or free up) how power is to be
exercised. Conceptualizing constructions simply as a system of
default rules does not adequately account for or allow political
actors to avoid making decisions about whether to create a
tradition of a two-term presidency, whether organized political
parties should be regarded as legitimate, whether a two-party
system should be fostered, whether to regard the protective tariff
as constitutionally illegitimate, or whether literacy tests for
voting should be regarded as permissible. Default rules may tell
some government officials to keep out of the way as some
decisions are being made, but they do not tell political actors
how those decisions ought to be made. But constitutional
constructions often are concerned with identifying appropriate
outcomes.
Constitutional assumptions and default rules can reduce the
effort that government officials need to make when they
encounter particular controversies and uncertainties. In
particular, default rules might be recommended to minimize the
extent to which judges actively engage in rendering new
constitutional constructions when faced with indeterminate
constitutional meaning. Nonetheless, the idea of constitutional
constructions is not rendered irrelevant by the possibility of
default rules. Default rules may alter how political actors
exercise their responsibilities, but they do not avoid the need for
supplementing the interpretive process in order to have a fully
functioning constitutional system.
IV. WHAT CAN CONSTRUCTIONS DO FOR YOU?
The interpretation-construction distinction is an academic
distinction. More particularly, the concept of a constitutional
construction is an analytical category. The claim is not that this is
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a familiar distinction or that “construction” (used in this way) is
a familiar idea within American constitutional discourse.
Political actors engage in the process of construing constitutional
meaning and creating institutions and practices to accomplish
their objectives. They do not necessarily conceptualize what they
do as operating in these terms. The value of recognizing
constitutional constructions is not in better replicating the
language of American constitutional practice. The value of
recognizing the concept (whether under the label “construction”
or something else) is that it helps the external observer better
understand how American constitutionalism works. With better
analytical and empirical understanding, better normative
theorizing can follow. But as with any conceptual tool, the
question is whether this one is helpful for performing tasks that
we might be interested in.
The interpretation-construction distinction has particular
25
utility for originalist normative theory. Originalism has faced a
number of traditional criticisms, and the concept of construction
helps to build a more compelling response to some of those
criticisms. Originalism is often accused of being overly rigid, of
being unable to account for constitutional development, and of
being unable to grapple with indeterminacy in constitutional
meaning. Subsuming originalist arguments about constitutional
interpretation and judicial review within a broader constitutional
theory that incorporates constitutional constructions alleviates
those concerns. Originalism qua originalism may provide an
adequate account of how the Constitution ought to be
interpreted and how courts ought to exercise the power of
judicial review, but it may not describe the complete operation
of the constitutional order. Originalists may benefit from
recognizing more explicitly that constitutional meaning is
sometimes indeterminate and that there are limits as to what
answers constitutional interpretation can provide. The question
then becomes what should political actors do when
constitutional interpretation runs out and constitutional
construction takes over. While some originalists might embrace
25. The interpretation-construction distinction is often associated with and viewed
as characteristic of “the new originalism.” It should be emphasized, however, that the
interpretation-construction distinction is separable from other features of recent
originalist theorizing. There is nothing about the idea of constitutional constructions, for
example, that implies a commitment to a semantic meaning approach to originalist
constitutional interpretation, even if some individual scholars happen to have embraced
both arguments. On the new originalism, see also Keith E. Whittington, The New
Originalism, 2 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL. 599 (2004).
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an active role for the courts in at least some circumstances in
constructing constitutional meaning in the interstices of the
originalist text, others might demur. Either way, constructions
provide a bridge between the fixed meaning of the interpreted
text of the originalist Constitution and the ongoing development
of constitutional practices, values and rules. Without a notion of
constitutional construction, originalists are tempted to deny or
paper over constitutional gaps or indeterminacies and to
minimize the importance of constitutional developments that do
not fit the originalist framework. Neither tendency is helpful or
necessary.
Making analytical space for constitutional constructions is
useful for constitutional theorists of a variety of persuasions.
Originalists have been particularly concerned with (vexed by?)
the tension between a fixed constitutional text and political
change and between the interpretive difficulties associated with
our constitutional text and the desire for answers to our
contemporary political problems. The idea of constructions
offers a vocabulary and a toolkit for addressing some of those
concerns. Constitutional theory writ large has other concerns,
but the idea of constructions may be useful in addressing some
of those as well. Constitutional theory does not have a rich
vocabulary for discussing what political actors do when they
engage in constitutional argumentation or take action in the
name of constitutional commitments. Often, any activity having
to do with the Constitution is simply called “interpretation.”
Regardless of how one understands interpretation (that is,
regardless of whether one accepts originalism as either a
conceptual or normative theory), such a broad category strips
the term of its analytical utility and obscures the diversity of
ways in which political actors relate to the Constitution.
Likewise, to the extent that the idea of interpretation is
connected to normative theories and used to help legitimate the
actions of judges, such arguments become more attenuated as
the notion of interpretation is loosened. The idea of
constructions can help distinguish the various ways in which
political actors engage with the Constitution and provide the
starting point for developing distinctive arguments for justifying
those various activities. There is nothing about the idea of
constructions that settles the issue of whether judges, for
example, should engage in them. Distinguishing between
interpretation and construction does focus attention on such
important normative questions as whether (and under what
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circumstances) judicial judgments should trump legislative
judgments when constitutional meaning is indeterminate or
about how constitutional gaps are to be filled.
Opening the field of constitutional constructions also holds
some promise for shaping the agenda of empirical inquiry into
constitutional politics and political development more broadly.
Constitutional construction is not the only form of constitutional
politics, but recognizing the importance of constructive activity
offers a variety of opportunities for expanding the scholarly
agenda and improving our understanding of the dynamics of
constitutional development. A concern with constitutional
interpretation focuses attention on textual analysis, modalities of
argument, and standards of evidence. An interest in
constitutional construction calls our attention to the process by
which new ideas come to the fore, practices are stabilized, and
institutions are put into place. Although both interpretation and
construction can occur throughout the political arena,
interpretive arguments tend to center around the courts.
Recognizing constitutional constructions potentially decenters
the scholarly agenda so as to take greater account of the range of
activity occurring throughout the political sphere by a range of
actors. Constructions also highlight the process of political and
constitutional development over time. The constitutional choices
and debates of today are made within the context of the
practices, institutions, and ideals that had been built up over
prior debates and decisions. The study of constitutional
constructions focuses our attention not only on arguments over
what the Constitution means but also over how the
constitutional system works, not only over how the Constitution
is interpreted but also over how political actors struggle over the
authority to interpret and what the consequences of past
constitutional controversies might be for the shape of current
ones.
The idea of constitutional constructions can play a role
within normative constitutional theory, but the starting point is
to better capture a distinction within constitutional
argumentation and practice. The ideal of interpretation does not
adequately represent what judges or political actors often do in
regard to the Constitution. The effort of discovering what the
text says is ultimately distinguishable from making choices about
what to do when the text is silent. Much of our working
Constitution consists of the choices that we have made in the
interstices of the interpretable Constitution. Constitutional
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constructions have supplied rules, practices, and institutions that
we have found satisfying, even when constitutional
interpretation had little to offer. They are how we live with a
written Constitution.

